Implications of reposting copyright material online and Svensson distinguished in CJEU judgment: Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff by SAW, Cheng Lim
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
9-2018
Implications of reposting copyright material online
and Svensson distinguished in CJEU judgment:
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff
Cheng Lim SAW
Singapore Management University, clsaw@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Transcript is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
SAW, Cheng Lim. Implications of reposting copyright material online and Svensson distinguished in CJEU judgment: Land
Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff. (2018). Singapore Academy of Law Journal. 30, 1126-1132. Research Collection School Of
Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/2819
© 2018 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
   
Published on e-First 14 October 2018 
 
Comment 
IMPLICATIONS OF REPOSTING COPYRIGHT MATERIAL 
ONLINE AND SVENSSON DISTINGUISHED IN  
CJEU JUDGMENT 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff 
(Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
This comment considers the CJEU’s recent decision in 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) 
EU:C:2018:634, concerning the legality of reposting 
copyright-protected material on the Internet. Notably, the 
earlier decision of the CJEU in Svensson – which was a case 
on hyperlinking and although cited fairly extensively in 
argument – was carefully distinguished on the facts. 
SAW Cheng Lim 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Cambridge); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 In the realm of copyright law, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”), over the years, has had numerous 
opportunities to consider the scope of the copyright owner’s exclusive 
right to “communicate” a work “to the public”.1 This is particularly 
notable in the line of cases that involved the online practice of 
hyperlinking and framing,2 with its genesis in Nils Svensson et al v 
Retriever Sverige AB3 (“Svensson”). More recently, the CJEU had 
occasion to consider, yet again, the same legal question – albeit on very 
                                                          
1 See, eg, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related 
rights in the information society Art 3(1). See also ss 26(1)(a)(iv) and 26(1)(b)(iii) – 
to be read with the definition of “communicate” in s 7(1) – of the Singapore 
Copyright Act (Cap 63, 2006 Rev Ed). 
2 See, eg, BestWater International GmbH v Michael Mebes et al (Case C-348/13) 
EU:C:2014:2315; GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al 
(Case C-160/15) EU:C:2016:644; [2016] Bus LR 1231; [2017] 1 CMLR 921; 
Stichting Brein v Jack Frederik Wullems (Case C-527/15) EU:C:2017:300; and 
Stichting Brein v Ziggo BV et al (Case C-610/15) EU:C:2017:456. 
3 (Case C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014] WLR(D) 67; [2014] 3 CMLR 4; [2014] 
ECDR 9; [2014] Bus LR 259; [2015] EMLR 5. 
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different facts – in Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff.4 
Although the outcome (and reasoning) of this latest CJEU decision is, to 
this author, far less controversial than that of the earlier hyperlinking 
cases,5 it is still worthy of comment for its timely reminder that all 
materials which are found/posted online without any accompanying 
access restrictions may not necessarily be (and usually are not) 
copyright-free. 
II. Factual background 
2 The facts briefly are these. A photographer had granted an 
exclusive licence to an online travel portal to use his photograph on  
its website, without imposing any access/downloading restrictions. 
A student from a secondary school in the German city of Waltrop 
managed to download that photograph from the travel portal without 
prior authorisation and then uploaded it – albeit with proper attribution 
as to source – on the school’s website for the purposes of a school 
project/presentation. The photographer (who was also the owner of 
copyright in the photograph) subsequently brought an infringement 
action against the school for having breached his exclusive rights to 
reproduce the work and to communicate (or make available) the work 
to the public. 
3 The legal question that is relevant for our purposes is whether 
the student’s act of uploading the photograph on the school’s website 
amounted to a “communication” of the copyright work “to the public” 
(indeed, to a “new public”).6 The Hamburg Regional Court (at first 
                                                          
4 (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634. 
5 Much academic ink has already been spilt on the various controversies 
surrounding these hyperlinking cases – see, eg, Alain Strowel & Nicolas Ide, 
“Liability With Regard to Hyperlinks” (2001) 24 Colum VLA J L & Arts 403; 
Maurice Schellekens, “Reframing Hyperlinks in Copyright” (2016) 38(7) EIPR 401; 
Matthias Leistner, “Closing the Book on the Hyperlinks: Brief Outline of the 
CJEU’s Case Law and Proposal for European Legislative Reform” (2017) 
39(6) EIPR 327; Lyubomira Midelieva, “Rethinking Hyperlinking: Addressing 
Hyperlinks to Unauthorised Content in Copyright Law and Policy” (2017) 
39(8) EIPR 479; and Cheng Lim Saw, “Linking on the Internet and Copyright 
Liability: A Clarion Call for Doctrinal Clarity and Legal Certainty” (2018) 
49(5) IIC 536. 
6 According to the established jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (see, eg, Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) 
EU:C:2014:76; [2014] WLR(D) 67; [2014] 3 CMLR 4; [2014] ECDR 9; [2014] Bus 
LR 259; [2015] EMLR 5 and its progeny), the plaintiff must prove that the 
copyright work in question had been communicated to a “new public” when the 
specific technical means employed by the defendant for the unauthorised 
communication are the same as those used for the initial communication 
authorised by the plaintiff. In this context, a “new public” means “a public that 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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instance) and the Higher Regional Court of Hamburg (on appeal) both 
ruled in favour of the photographer on the copyright point, 
notwithstanding that the photograph in question could easily have 
been accessed and downloaded from the travel portal itself by any 
Internet user. When the dispute was subsequently brought before the 
Bundesgerichtshof on a point of law, the German Federal Court of Justice 
decided to stay proceedings and refer the following question to the 
CJEU for a preliminary ruling:7 
Does the inclusion of a work – which is freely accessible to all internet 
users on a third-party website with the consent of the copyright 
holder – on a person’s own publicly accessible website constitute a 
making available of that work to the public within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of [the EU Information Society Directive][8] if the work is 
first copied onto a server and is uploaded from there to that person’s 
own website? 
III. Comment on CJEU’s holding 
4 The CJEU answered the above question in the affirmative, 
after setting out the twin criteria for the concept of “communication to 
the public” – namely, an “act of communication” of a work and the 
communication of that work to a “public” (in this case, to a “new 
public”).9 
5 As regards the requirement that there must first be an “act of 
communication”, the court reiterated the test set out in its earlier 
decision in Svensson that the work in question must have been made 
available by the defendant “in such a way that the persons forming [the] 
public may access it, irrespective of whether or not they avail themselves 
of that opportunity”.10 Given that the student’s act of uploading the 
                                                                                                                               
was not already taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised 
the initial communication to the public of their work”: see Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 at [24]. 
7 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [12]. 
8 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society. 
9 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [19]. 
10 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [20] (citing Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) 
EU:C:2014:76; [2014] WLR(D) 67; [2014] 3 CMLR 4; [2014] ECDR 9; [2014] Bus 
LR 259; [2015] EMLR 5 (“Svensson”) at [19]). For a critique of the Court of Justice 
of the European Union’s test of “access” as articulated in Svensson in the 
hyperlinking context, see Cheng Lim Saw, “Linking on the Internet and Copyright 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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photograph on the school’s website “gives visitors to the website on 
which it is posted the opportunity to access the photograph on that 
website”,11 the first criterion was, uncontroversially, found to be satisfied. 
6 In relation to whether the photograph in question had been 
communicated (or made available) by the defendant to a “new public”,12 
the CJEU also came to a positive conclusion after carefully considering 
the arguments raised by both sides. Relevantly, should a distinction be 
made at law between, on the one hand, a defendant who uploads an 
infringing copy of the copyright work on his own website (here, the 
school’s website) and, on the other,13 one who simply furnishes a 
hyperlink on his own website that directs Internet users to the target 
website (here, the online travel portal) on which the same work had 
initially been made available to the public without any access 
restrictions and with the consent of the copyright owner? 
7 On one view, it may be argued that because the copyright work 
in question had already been made available to the public on the target 
website without the copyright owner imposing any restrictions as 
regards access, there ought to be no copyright repercussions for the 
defendant to subsequently upload a copy of the same work on his own 
website without first obtaining the copyright owner’s consent. However, 
the CJEU quite rightly pointed out that this argument is inherently 
flawed as this will be tantamount to an outright exhaustion of the 
copyright owner’s rights14 to control the further exploitation of the 
copyright work after its initial posting online15 – which, in any event, is 
in violation of Art 3(3) of the EU Information Society Directive16 
(“the Directive”). Further, the CJEU also emphasised that it was 
“irrelevant” to the legal issue at hand that “the copyright holder did not 
limit the ways in which Internet users could use the photograph”, saying 
                                                                                                                               
Liability: A Clarion Call for Doctrinal Clarity and Legal Certainty” (2018) 
49(5) IIC 536. 
11 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [21]. 
12 Because both the initial communication of the photograph on the travel portal and 
its subsequent communication on the school’s website were made with the same 
technical means. 
13 Cf the facts and outcome of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s decision 
in Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014] 
WLR(D) 67; [2014] 3 CMLR 4; [2014] ECDR 9; [2014] Bus LR 259; [2015] 
EMLR 5. 
14 The Court of Justice of the European Union termed such rights as rights of a 
“preventive nature”: see Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff 
(Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 at [29] and [30]. 
15 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [30]–[31]. 
16 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [32]–[33]. 
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that the enjoyment and exercise of the right of communication to the 
public (as enshrined in Art 3(1) of the Directive) “[should] not be 
subject to any formality”.17 
8 On the contrary, and as the facts of the instant case well 
illustrate, the student/school had clearly communicated (or made 
available) the plaintiff ’s photograph to a “new public” because the public 
gaining access to the copyright work on the school’s website would not 
be the same public that the copyright owner had in mind when he 
authorised the initial posting of the photograph on the website of the 
travel portal.18 This is quite unlike the factual scenario in Svensson 
where, in light of the mechanics of how a hyperlink operates in the 
online environment,19 the public gaining access to the copyright work 
hosted on the target website via a hyperlink supplied on the linking 
website is not any different from the public gaining access to the same 
work upon visiting the target website directly. 
9 Crucially, the CJEU was careful to point out that their earlier 
decision in Svensson – which was “handed down in the specific context 
of hyperlinks” – was not a relevant precedent for the purposes of the 
instant case for a variety of reasons.20 In particular, the court observed 
that the student, in reproducing the plaintiff ’s photograph on a private 
server and then uploading it on the school’s website, had “played a 
decisive role in the communication of that work to a [new] public” 
[emphasis added].21 This was to be contrasted with “the lack of any 
                                                          
17 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [36]. 
18 See Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [35]: 
In such circumstances, the public taken into account by the copyright holder 
when he consented to the communication of his work on the website on 
which it was originally published is composed solely of users of that site and 
not of users of the website on which the work was subsequently published 
without the consent of the rightholder, or other internet users. 
19 What a hyperlink does, in essence, is to connect a user’s Web browser (after the 
user has clicked on the hyperlink supplied on the linking website) with the target 
website. The user then interacts directly with the interface of the target website, 
as though the user had visited the target website directly without having relied on 
the hyperlink. 
20 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [39]. See, more generally, [37] ff. 
21 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [46]. 
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involvement by the administrator of the site on which the clickable link 
had been inserted” [emphasis added] in the Svensson decision.22 
10 Ultimately, the CJEU answered the question that was referred to 
it in the following terms:23 
[T]he concept of ‘communication to the public’, within the meaning of 
Article 3(1) of [the EU Information Society Directive], must be 
interpreted as meaning that it covers the posting on one website of a 
photograph previously posted, without any restriction preventing it 
from being downloaded and with the consent of the copyright holder, 
on another website. 
IV. Conclusion 
11 This recent decision of the CJEU is indeed a timely reminder 
that the unauthorised reposting of a copyright work on one’s own 
website gives rise to a “new” communication to the public – which is 
independent of the initial communication of the same work on another 
website authorised by the copyright owner – and is therefore an 
infringement of copyright (subject, of course, to applicable defences). It 
would certainly do well for all Internet users to remember that if a 
copyright work (which has already been made freely available on 
another website with the consent of the copyright owner) must be 
referenced or referred to, it is best to simply supply a hyperlink to it on 
one’s own website so as to be able to take advantage of the CJEU’s 
fact-specific Svensson decision. 
                                                          
22 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [45]. With respect, this is a rather curious distinction to draw. If it were indeed 
true that there was a “lack of any involvement by the administrator of the site on 
which the clickable link had been inserted [namely, the ‘hyperlinker’]”, then it 
appears natural to this author to question whether it would have been more 
appropriate for the Court of Justice of the European Union in Nils Svensson et al v 
Retriever Sverige AB (Case C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014] WLR(D) 67; [2014] 
3 CMLR 4; [2014] ECDR 9; [2014] Bus LR 259; [2015] EMLR 5 to have examined 
the potential copyright liability of the hyperlinker in that case through the lens of 
accessory or indirect liability instead, rather than from the perspective of primary 
or direct liability (which analytical model appears better suited to cases where the 
alleged defendant had “played a decisive role” in the communication of the 
copyright work to the public). See, in this regard, the commentary in Cheng Lim 
Saw, “Linking on the Internet and Copyright Liability: A Clarion Call for Doctrinal 
Clarity and Legal Certainty” (2018) 49(5) IIC 536 (especially at 549–553). 
23 Land Nordrhein-Westfalen v Dirk Renckhoff (Case C-161/17) EU:C:2018:634 
at [47]. 
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12 In summary, reposting copyright-protected material online 
clearly flouts copyright law, but the converse is true in so far as 
hyperlinking to freely accessible and licensed content is concerned.24 
 
                                                          
24 Readers are advised that the concession made by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (“CJEU”) in Nils Svensson et al v Retriever Sverige AB 
(Case C-466/12) EU:C:2014:76; [2014] WLR(D) 67; [2014] 3 CMLR 4; [2014] 
ECDR 9; [2014] Bus LR 259; [2015] EMLR 5 only applies in cases where the 
hyperlink supplied leads Internet users to freely accessible online material which 
was made available to the public with the consent of the copyright owner. The legal 
consequences vis-à-vis copyright liability on the part of the hyperlinker may well 
be different where the source material in question – though freely accessible by the 
public – had been posted on the target website without the consent of the copyright 
owner. In this regard, readers are also advised to consult the CJEU’s later decision 
in GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands BV et al (Case C-160/15) 
EU:C:2016:644; [2016] Bus LR 1231; [2017] 1 CMLR 921 (“GS Media”) in which 
the court sought to draw a distinction between cases where the posting of the 
hyperlink was carried out for profit (in which case, a rebuttable presumption will 
arise – so declared the CJEU – that the hyperlinker possessed actual knowledge that 
the hyperlink would have directed users to material which had been made freely 
accessible on the target website without the consent of the copyright owner) and 
those where the posting of the hyperlink was carried out without a profit motive 
(in which case, it would be relevant to consider whether the hyperlinker possessed 
actual or constructive knowledge of the same). For further commentary on the 
various controversies engendered by the GS Media decision (particularly in 
relation to the new “knowledge” requirement), see Cheng Lim Saw, “Linking on 
the Internet and Copyright Liability: A Clarion Call for Doctrinal Clarity and Legal 
Certainty” (2018) 49(5) IIC 536 (especially at 544–548). The author is grateful to 
the anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this footnote. 
